Differential privacy has emerged as a formal framework for protecting sensitive information in networked systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed and multi-agent systems have emerged across a wide array of applications, with the underlying principle always that a collection of agents can work together by exchanging information. Examples of such systems include smart cities [1] , intelligent transportation systems [2] , and smart power grids [3] , [4] . In some cases, the exchanged information is sensitive. For instance, an individual sharing location data with a smart transportation system can be exposed by repeatedly disclosing their origin and destination during their daily commute [5] . Naturally, users wish to protect sensitive data of this kind. Therefore, it is necessary to preserve the privacy of individuals, although their information must remain useful for effective analysis and decision making in the network.
In recent years, differential privacy has become a common framework for privacy of this kind. Differential privacy started in the database literature [6] and is used in privacy preservation of database entries when database queries are made. More recently, differential privacy has been extended to trajectories arising in systems and control in [7] , where the goal is to preserve the privacy of trajectories of data as they are generated.
Differential privacy is simple to implement because it merely requires adding noise to sensitive data (or functions of sensitive data). Differential privacy has several other properties that make it useful in multi-agent system applications. Differential privacy is immune to post-processing and robust to side-information, which means that its privacy guarantees are invariant under post-hoc transformations and that they are not weakened by much with the availability of auxiliary information. As a result, further computations can be performed once data is privatized. Of course, adding noise changes the accuracy of these computations relative to their noise-free counterparts, and the effects of differential privacy have been investigated in several contexts, e.g., [6] - [12] .
Multi-agent systems must share data to run. In combination with the vulnerability of dynamic data streams, this need has stimulated the use of differential privacy along with model-based state estimators to both protect sensitive data and make useful control decisions in the presence of privacy. Differential privacy's immunity to post-processing means that state estimation and filtering can be performed freely without threatening the privacy guarantees of agents' data. The Kalman filter is a widely used state estimator which has been shown to improve the utility of privatized data in various settings [7] , [13] . One common approach to differentially private Kalman filtering is to have agents add noise directly to the outputs they share; this approach is broadly termed "input perturbation," because individual agents add noise to the inputs of the Kalman filter. This approach has the advantage of privatizing all data before it is ever shared, eliminating the need for a trusted aggregator.
In this paper, we analyze the accuracy of Kalman filtering private data under the input perturbation paradigm.
We consider agents with discrete-time dynamics, and we protect each agent's state trajectory by adding noise to its outputs at each point in time. We quantify the effects of privacy in two ways. First, we use differential entropy to quantify the information content of the privatized trajectories. Second, we investigate the practical effects of privacy by bounding the mean squared error of an observer's estimate of the agents' states.
Although there is a large body of existing privacy research, privacy parameter interpretation and selection both largely remain the domain of subject matter experts. Based on the bounds we derive, we provide guidelines for selecting one's privacy level based on the downstream filtering error it induces. Through doing so, we provide the ability to calibrate one's privacy levels based on conventional control-theoretic concerns (i.e., filtering error), thereby enabling meaningful privacy calibration without requiring in-depth knowledge of differential privacy. This paper expands on our previous results by providing precise guidelines on calibrating a desired level of performance [14] , [15] . In addition, this paper differs from [7] , [16] because those papers design private filters, whereas we characterize a common Kalman filter setup rather than designing filtering strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the necessary background for differential privacy and sets up the problem statement. In Section III, we outline the privacy implementation for our problem and briefly review Kalman filtering. Section IV presents the main results of the paper, which are bounds on the differential entropy and MSE of state estimates based on private data. In Section V, we provide guidelines for picking privacy levels based on pre-specified bounds. Next, we present numerical simulations in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND ON DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we first briefly review the relevant privacy background as it pertains to private Kalman filtering specifically, and we refer the reader to [7] for a complete exposition. Then we state the problem that is the subject of the paper. March 21, 2019 DRAFT
A. Review of Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a quantitative and statistical means of protecting data. Differential privacy makes it unlikely that an adversary or eavesdropper can make high-fidelity inferences about individuals by looking at their privatized data. It is enforced by adding noise to sensitive data (or functions thereof). Control theory provides many techniques that compensate for noise, making differential privacy a natural choice in control-theoretic settings.
Differential privacy is immune to post-processing, which means that transforming private data does not harm its privacy guarantees. In particular, filtering private trajectories does not degrade the protections of differential privacy.
The guarantees of differential privacy are also robust to mechanism knowledge, which means that adversaries do not gain any advantage if they know the mechanism used to privatize data [6] , [17] .
In this paper, we consider a collection of N agents. The state trajectory of each agent is sensitive, and therefore it needs to be protected. Denote agent i's state trajectory by x i . The k th element of x i is denoted by
for some n i ∈ N, and we also set n = N i=1 n i , which is the dimension of all agents' states in aggregate. We then concatenate the states of all agents within the network into the network-level state
The notion of differential privacy in this paper follows the definition of differential privacy for trajectories introduced in [7] and applied in [18] . Differential privacy can be used to ensure that an adversary is unlikely to determine either the input or state trajectory of a system, and in this paper we implement differential privacy to protect state trajectories.
In this work, we consider the so-called "input perturbation" approach to differential privacy. This means that each agent will directly add noise to its own outputs before sharing them, and this has the advantage of masking sensitive data before it is shared. Privacy guarantees are likewise provided on an individual basis, and the input perturbation approach will be used below to protect individual agent's state trajectories. Formally, each agent's state trajectory will be made approximately indistinguishable from other nearby state trajectories which that agent individually could have produced; the notions of "nearby" and "approximately indistinguishable" are formalized below in Definitions 1 and 2.
We consider vector-valued trajectories of the general form
The state trajectory x i is contained in the setl ni 2 , which is the set of sequences of vectors in R ni whose finite truncations are all in ℓ ni 2 . Formally, we define the truncation operator P T over trajectories according to Next is a formal definition of differential privacy for dynamical systems which specifies the probabilistic guarantees of privacy. To state it, we will use a probability space (Ω,F ,P). This definition considers outputs in the spacẽ ℓ qi 2 and uses a σ-algebra overl
, construction of which can be found in [19] .
is (ǫ i , δ i )-differentially private if and only if, for all adjacent
We consider a network of N agents in which each agent has linear dynamics. At time k, agent i has state x i (k) ∈ R ni , with discrete-time linear dynamics
where process noise for each agent is denoted by w i (k) ∈ R ni and the matrices H i ∈ R ni×ni and C i ∈ R qi×ni are time-invariant. The probability distribution of the process noise is given by
, and all process noise terms are assumed to have finite variance. At each time k, agent i outputs the value y i (k). Absent any privacy protections, the values of y i could reveal those of x i over time, which would compromise agent i's privacy. Therefore, noise must be added to agent i's output to protect its state trajectory.
Calibrating the level of noise is done using the "sensitivity" of an agent's output map, which we define next for the input perturbation privacy we use; we emphasize that, although agents perturb the outputs of their own dynamics, the "input perturbation" label applies because agents perturb what will become the inputs to a Kalman filter. The following bound is adapted from [7, Section IV-A].
Definition 3. (Sensitivity for Input Perturbation Privacy)
The ℓ 2 -norm sensitivity of agent i's output map is the greatest distance between two output trajectories which correspond to adjacent state trajectories. Formally, for [15] . Various mechanisms have been developed for enforcing differential privacy in the literature [6] . The Gaussian mechanism requires adding Gaussian noise to outputs to mask agents' state trajectories, and it can be useful in control settings that are robust to Gaussian noise. We next provide a definition of the Gaussian mechanism in terms of the Q-function, defined by Q (y) =
Lemma 1. (Input Perturbation Gaussian Mechanism for Linear Systems)
Let agent i specify privacy parameters ǫ i > 0 and δ i ∈ (0, 1 /2). Let y i ∈l qi 2 denote the output of a system with state trajectories inl ni 2 , and denote its ℓ 2 -norm sensitivity by ∆ ℓ2 y i . Then the Gaussian mechanism for (ǫ i , δ i )-differential privacy takes the form
where v i is a stochastic process with v i (k) ∼ N 0, σ 2 i I qi , I qi is the q i × q i identity matrix, and
This Gaussian mechanism provides (ǫ i , δ i )-differential privacy.
Proof:
In words, the Gaussian mechanism adds i.i.d Gaussian noise point-wise in time to the output of a system to keep its state trajectory private. We will use the Gaussian mechanism to enforce differential privacy for the remainder of the paper.
B. Problem Formulation
Having covered the relevant privacy background, we now state the problem that is the focus of the paper.
Problem 1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ N , assume each agent has a publicly known mean initial conditionx − i (0), and let agent i have
Keep the state trajectories of agent i differentially private according to agent-specific privacy parameters (ǫ i , δ i ).
Next, investigate the effects of privacy in the following ways:
(a) Given privacy parameters (ǫ i , δ i ), quantify the ability of the recipients of the privatized outputs to accurately estimate the actual state trajectories of each agent i.
(b) Develop guidelines for choosing agent i's privacy parameters (ǫ i , δ i ) to achieve pre-specified bounds on filter error. △
We will examine Part (a) by quantifying filtering error and entropy in terms of agents' privacy parameters. Part (b)
will then use these error bounds to inform how agents select their privacy parameters.
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where
The initial state of the system is denoted byx
, where the minus sign will be used to initialize a Kalman filter which will be defined formally later, and is assumed to be publicly available. The next section presents our privacy implementation.
III. PRIVATE FILTERING IMPLEMENTATION
We consider scenarios in which agents share their privatized outputs with a data aggregator, such as a utility company in a smart power gird or a traffic monitor in a smart transportation system. Abstracting away implementation details, we simply say that agent i sends its outputs to an aggregator, and this aggregator will run a Kalman filter.
To protect its own privacy, agent i only shares its privatized outputs with the aggregator. The privatized outputs of agent i may also be received by a wide range of other entities e.g., other agents in the network, adversaries, an eavesdropper, and data analysts, and our results apply to these other recipients as well. Without privacy, this transmission of data could reveal its state trajectory, and, as a result, compromise agent i's privacy. Hence, agent i adds privacy noise at each time k to its output before sharing it:
where the privacy noise v i (k) ∼ N 0, σ 2 i I qi as in Lemma 1. Introducing privacy naturally involves sacrificing a level of accuracy, and the trade-offs and effects of privacy need to be rigorously evaluated to quantify the performance of private filtering.
The aggregator receives the privatized outputs of individual agents and implements a Kalman filter. The Kalman filter minimizes the mean squared error (MSE) of both prediction and estimation in the setting of this paper, which studies linear systems with Gaussian noise. Mathematically, the Kalman filter minimizes both
wherex − (k) andx(k) respectively denote the a priori state prediction and a posteriori state estimate of the Kalman filter for the network-level state at time k. As noted in Problem 1, the termx − (0) is assumed to be publicly known.
The update equation for the prediction step of the Kalman filter is evaluated as [20] x − (k + 1) = Hx(k), and the a posteriori state estimatex(k) is updated aŝ
Assuming the observability of the pair (H, C) and controllability of the pair (A, D), where W = DD T , the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ is computed as
where the a priori error covariance matrix Σ is the unique positive semidefinite solution to the discrete algebraic Riccati equation
It is provably unlikely for the recipients ofỹ(k) to distinguish an agent's actual state trajectory from an adjacent one. In this setting, the Kalman filter minimizes the error in state prediction and estimation in the mean square sense. Therefore, studying the connection between the Kalman filter and data privacy can elucidate fundamental limits of information accuracy when dealing with private trajectories. That is the subject to the next section.
IV. QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF PRIVACY
In this section, we explicitly quantify the ability of the aggregator or any potential recipient of private data, e.g., other agents, an adversary, or an eavesdropper, to uncover the state trajectory of an agent using its privatized outputs. One natural way to do so is to bound the MSE of the prediction and estimation steps of a Kalman filter that processes private data. Bounding these errors as functions of agents' privacy parameters will directly connect agents' privacy levels to the accuracy with which the aggregator can estimate their state values. We proceed by developing trace bounds for the a priori error covariance matrix Σ and the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ, which are equal to the MSE of the prediction and MSE of the estimate in the Kalman filter, respectively. Because the Kalman filter minimizes both of these quantities, lower bounds on them are lower bounds on MSE for any filtering strategy.
Toward doing so, the following lemma upper and lower bounds the trace of a matrix product. In it, we use λ n (K) ≤ · · · ≤ λ 1 (K) to denote the eigenvalues of the matrix K.
Lemma 2. Let K and S be n × n matrices. If K = K T ≥ 0 and S is symmetric, then
Proof: See [21, Fact 5.12.4].
We next have an analogous lemma for matrix sums.
Lemma 3. Let K and S be n × n Hermitian matrices. Then Assume the matrix C is diagonal and positive definite. Below, we will repeatedly encounter the term
and we present bounds that we will use below. First,
Next, we present lower and upper bounds for the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter as functions of agents' privacy noise.
Theorem 1.
The a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter can be bounded according to
Proof: The MSE of the predictions of the Kalman filter is equal to the trace of the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter as given in Equation (III). We obtain the following by taking the trace of Equation (III):
where we have used the cyclic permutation property of the trace. Next, we use Lemma 2 to write
where we apply Lemma 3 on the third line to split up the eigenvalues and use the fact that λ 1 (Σ −1 ) = 1 /λn(Σ) in the final step. It is shown in [22, Theorem 3.1] that Σ ≥ W , and therefore λ n (Σ) ≥ λ n (W ). Using this fact and Equation (IV), we find 
where in the second step we have used λ 1 (M −1 ) = 1 /λn(M) and the third step uses Lemma 3 to split the eigenvalues.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 1 bounds the MSE of the aggregator's prediction of the network as a whole, which quantifies the ability of the aggregator to infer the state of the agents. The following theorem presents similar bounds for Σ.
Theorem 2. Suppose an agent shares its privatized output trajectory, and the aggregator has all public information.
Then, the steady-state MSE of the a posteriori estimate of the network state is bounded by
Proof: Computing the MSE of the estimation error E x(k) −x(k)
2 is equivalent to the trace of the a posteriori error covariance matrix Σ in Equation (III). Using Lemma 2, a lower bound for the trace of Σ can derived as
where in the third line we have used Lemma 3 to split the eigenvalues. In the last line, we use Σ ≥ W based on 
where in the last line λ n (Σ −1 ) > 0 is eliminated.
Together, the upper and lower bounds on tr(Σ) give MSE bounds which can be used to analyze the balance between privacy and accuracy of information shared with the aggregator.
Privacy and utility can be inherently conflicting goals, in the sense that the greater the level of privacy is, the less useful information will generally be. To study this relationship, we use an information theoretic tool to investigate the effects of the privacy noise v(k). We consider the differential entropy in the a posteriori estimatesx(k) and a priori predictionsx − (k), which were defined in Section III. Shannon entropy has been used to investigate the leakage of information while using differential privacy in other settings, for example in [8] and in distributed linear control systems [23] . Differential entropy is useful for Gaussian distributions because it bounds the sub-level sets of R −1 , where R (y) = 1 − 2Q (y), which is the volume of a covariance ellipsoid. Therefore, we will quantify the effects of privacy noise upon the aggregator by studying how privacy noise affects ln det Σ and ln det Σ, which are within an additive and multiplicative factor of the differential entropy of error inx andx − , respectively. Next, we present the log-determinant bounds for the a priori covariance of the Kalman filter.
Theorem 3. Suppose that
, and s 1 (·) ≥ · · · ≥ s n (·) denote the singular values of a matrix. The log-determinant of the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter can be upper-bounded as
. Furthermore, the log-determinant of the a priori error covariance of the Kalman filter can be lower-bounded as
Proof: See [15] , [17] .
Moreover, we present bounds on the log-determinant of the a posteriori error covariance of the Kalman filter.
To do so, we provide the following lemmas. In order to facilitate the following analysis let us define the function
where X = X T Lemma 4. If A ≻ 0 and B 0, then there exists t ≥ 0 such that tA ≥ B.
Proof: See [24, Lemma 3].
Lemma 5. For every t ≥ 0, we have
Proof : Inspired by the work in [24] , let t ≥ 0. Then we can write
Lemma 6. Let S be an n × n Hermitian matrix. Then,
We now present our log-determinant bounds for Σ.
Theorem 4. The log-determinant of the a posteriori error covariance of the Kalman filter can be bounded as
Proof: Evaluating the function in Equation (IV) at Σ, we get
By Lemma 4, there exists a t ≥ 0 such that
Since f is a monotonic function [24] , we can write
and therefore by Lemma 2,
Taking the log-determinant of both sides we get
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where, due to the similarity of the steps of this proof to the proof for Theorem 2, we have omitted the explanations for each step. Using Equation (IV) and taking the log-determinant of the both sides of the above equation, we can write
and the theorem follows.
Of course, beyond merely studying the impacts of privacy, one can leverage these bounds to enable better privacy parameter selection, and that is the subject of the next section.
V. GUIDELINES FOR SELECTING PRIVACY PARAMETERS
In this section, we develop new guidelines for selecting privacy parameters, which will allow us to achieve specified filtering error bounds. These bounds enable the calibration of privacy levels based on the desired accuracy of those making decisions based on private data, as well as individuals' privacy desires. The value of the privacy parameter δ is typically chosen to be small. Often, δ is chosen in [10 −5 , 0.1] and we adopt this for range for the rest of the paper. A sufficient condition to do so is to bound ǫ i via
and 
Using the fact that √ K + S ≤ √ K + √ S, substituting for η 3 , and rearranging, we have
which implies that
From this, it follows that
which by comparing to Theorem 1 implies that trΣ ≤ B u .
Next, choose ǫ i ≤ 1 /η1. Given K δi ≥ 1, we can write ǫ i ≤ K δ i/η1 and rearranging the terms, we find η 1 ≤
ǫi . Substitute for η 1 , square, and rearrange to get
Now,
and therefore
and by Theorem 1, choosing ǫ i as above is sufficient to guarantee trΣ ≥ B l .
Theorem 5 presents upper and lower bounds for the privacy parameter ǫ i that can ensure that a priori filtering error remains within acceptable bounds. Next, we provide analogous bounds for a posteriori error. 
for all i where
and
and solve for η 4 to get
As a result, similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we can write
we can lower-bound the left-hand-side to write
Squaring both sides, substituting in η 4 , and rearranging we get
which is equivalent to σ ǫi . Similar to steps in Theorem 5, we substitute for η 2 and square both sides to write
and therefore, by upper-bounding the right-hand-side and rearranging we write We proceed to enforce input perturbation differential privacy as it was discussed in Section III. We choose (ǫ i , δ i ) = (ln 3, 0.001) for all i, which gives σ i = 2.96. The privacy noise v i (k) ∼ N 0, σ 2 i I 2×2 is added to the outputs y i at each time k. The aggregator receives the private outputs pointwise in time and runs a Kalman filter, and we simulate this setup for 100 timesteps.
This in turn implies
The results of this simulation are presented in Figures 1 and 2 . In Figure 1 , we present the MSE bounds derived in Theorem 1, and we compare them with the actual instantaneous a priori error. On average, the apriori error in predictions of the agents' states remains within the given bounds; ephemeral bound violations are expected as these bounds pertain to average error. In Figure 2 , we demonstrate the instantaneous error of the estimated states of the aggregate network and we compare that with the upper and lower bounds which were derived in Theorem 2. As expected, the instantaneous a posteriori error typically lies within the bounds derived in Theorems 2. Both these plots illustrate our predictions of the ability of the aggregator to predict or estimate the states of agents in the network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed new guidelines for calibrating the levels of privacy when enforcing differential privacy in linear systems with Gaussian noise. These guidelines were chosen to attain desired filtering error bounds, and novel bounds were presented for both filter entropy and filter error in terms of agents' privacy noise. Future work includes investigating general filtering techniques in which nonlinear systems are considered, with potential applications in smart power grids and autonomous systems.
